Domain theory suggests that moral rules and conventions are perceived differently and elicit a different response. A special procedure was designed to test this hypothesis in a laboratory setting using a deontic reasoning task. The goal was to gain insight into the cognitive and metacognitive processes of deontic reasoning from simple deontic premises. In the 3x2x2 within-subjects design, we varied rule-content (moral, conventional, abstract), rule-type (obligation, permission) and the induced dilemma (punishment dilemma, reward dilemma). Participants (N = 78) were presented with 12 laws. After memorizing a law, eight cases were presented to participants so that they make a quick judgment. Participants were tasked with punishing rule-violators, ignoring rule-conformists, and rewarding rule-supererogation. Response times (RT) and accuracy were measured for each judgment, and final confidence was measured after a set of judgments. No differences were expected between rule-types, except for superior performance for moral content and punishment dilemmas. RT correlated negatively with confidence levels, while accuracy correlated positively. Moral reasoning was more accurate than conventional and abstract reasoning, and produced higher confidence levels. Better performance was found for punishment dilemmas than reward dilemmas, likely due to the presence of a cheater-detection module; but the differences were not found in moral reasoning. Moral reasoning was also independent of rule-type, while conventional and abstract reasoning produced superior performance in obligation-type than in permission-type rules. A large drop-off in accuracy was detected for rules that allowed undesirable behaviour, a phenomenon we termed the "deontic blind spot". However, this blind spot was not present in moral reasoning.; Teorija domena pretpostavlja da se moralna i konvencionalna pravila drugačije percipiraju i rezultiraju različitim odgovorima. Osmišljena je procedura za testiranje ove hipoteze u laboratorijskim uvjetima koristeći zadatak deontičkog rasuđivanja. Cilj je bio dobiti uvid u kognitivne i metakognitivne procese deontičkog rasuđivanja polazeći od jednostavnih deontičkih premisa. Korištenjem nacrta 3x2x2 s ponovljenim mjerenjima manipulirali smo sadržajem pravila (moralna, konvencionalna, apstraktna), tipom pravila (obaveze, dopuštenja) i induciranom dilemom (dilema kažnjavanja, dilema nagrađivanja). Sudionicima (N = 78) prikazano je 12 zakona. Nakon što su zapamtili zakon, prezentirano im je osam slučajeva za koje su morali donijeti brzu odluku. Zadatak im je bio kažnjavanje prekršitelja, ignoriranje konformista i nagrađivanje supererogatornih. Mjereno je vrijeme odgovora i točnost za svaku odluku te konačna sigurnost nakon jednog niza odluka. Nisu očekivane razlike između tipova pravila, ali je očekivana bolja izvedba kod moralnih sadržaja i dilema kažnjavanja. Vrijeme je odgovora bilo negativno, a točnost pozitivno povezana s razinom sigurnosti. Moralno rasuđivanje bilo je točnije od konvencionalnog i apstraktnog te je dovelo do više razine sigurnosti. Bolja je izvedba utvrđena pri dilemama kažnjavanja u usporedbi s nagrađivanjem, vjerojatno zbog prisutnosti modula za detekciju varalica, ali te razlike nisu utvrđene pri moralnom rasuđivanju. Moralno je rasuđivanje također bilo neovisno o tipu pravila, dok su konvencionalno i apstraktno rasuđivanje doveli do bolje izvedbe pri obavezama nego dopuštenjima. Velik je pad u točnosti utvrđen za pravila koja su dopuštala nepoželjna ponašanja, što je fenomen koji smo nazvali "deontička slijepa pjega". Ipak, ova slijepa pjega nije bila prisutna pri moralnom rasuđivanju.